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Mapping - The Missing Link
in Reducing Risk Under SARA III*
Ute J. Dymon*
Introduction
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) was passed.1 Congress amended it
with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA).2 Title III of SARA (SARA III) is entitled, "Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know" - the subject of this
article. Local communities have since strived to reduce risks by
complying with it. SARA III makes communities responsible for their
own safety in the event of, e.g., explosions or chemical spills. How
effectively have local governments complied? In at least one planning
realm with potent possibilities for supporting local emergency
managers, achievement is lacking. Most communities need more
detailed emergency planning maps, and in the Northeast, comprising
Region I of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), effective
multi-hazard risk maps called for under the Act have yet to be created.
In describing how maps are employed to manage hazards, this
paper will consider the role hazard management mapping plays in
emergency planning/hazard management under SARA III. It will also
address how hazard mapping by local emergency planning committees
(LEPCs) has aided hazard identification and other phases of local
* This paper is based on field research conducted in the wake of a gasoline spill in
Marlborough, MA. The author thanks Leonard Wallace for insightful comments and
suggestions and Paula Hayden for help in preparing the map.
** Dr. Dymon is Assistant Professor of Geography at Kent State University. She
received her Ph.D. (Geography) from Clark University.
1 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
2 P.L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. See, e.g., U.S. Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the Environmental Protection Agency, Superfimd Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) (1986).
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hazard management, the extent to which risk mapping has been
accomplished and a case study of how one community coped with an
emergency without computer mapping resources. First, however, it may
be useful to review Winter's 1993 hazard management map
taxonomy 3 that regards hazard, risk and emergency as the three
major categories.
Hazard maps identify and display the location of hazard zones,
areas where there are dangers to humans and their property. Usually
these depict "hazard zone geometries" as outlined by Zeigler, Johnson
and Brunn. 4 Risk maps require calculation of the conditional
probability that a given area will experience a particular hazard or a
combination of hazards and portrays the spatial distribution of those
risk computations.
The last category, emergency maps, comprise three additional
types: planning, evacuation and crisis maps. Planning for four aspects
of emergency management - mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery - requires pre-event mapping by emergency groups,
especially for best use of organizations such as fire, police, public works
departments, the Red Cross and public utilities. Evacuation maps are
normally produced prior to emergencies and include identifying
sensitive populations. They offer a visual plan for moving people in
times of danger. Crisis mapping occurs during or immediately after an
emergency and encompasses any attempt to map on-the-spot
conditions comprising the emergency situation.
Legal and Political Background of Hazard
Management Mapping under SARA III
The number of accidents and disasters necessitating evacuation of
large numbers of people has increased rapidly over the past decade. In
the U.S. during the 1980's, emergency evacuations were required much
3 Nancy L. Winter, Hazard Management Mapping: A Taxonomy, 16 Proc. Appl.
Geog. Con. 173-174 (1993).
4 Donald J. Zeigler, James H. Johnson & Stanley D. Brunn, Technological
Hazards 14 (1983).
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more frequently than in the past 5 and seem likely to continue to
increase. 6 On-site or in-transit emergencies involving hazardous
chemicals have the potential to affect almost any community in the
U.S., both rural and urban, and this provides a major challenge to
emergency managers. Control of chemicals capable of causing accidents
serious enough to require public evacuation is now the responsibility of
local governments.
Since 1986, when Congress passed SARA III, each state is obligated
to form an emergency response commission whose task it is to
designate emergency planning districts for the preparation and
implementation of emergency response plans. Each district then
establishes an LEPC with broad duties including public distribution of
a local emergency plan. Members of an LEPC are broadly
representative, including elected State and local officials; local law
enforcement, civil defense, firefighting and first aid personnel; health,
environmental, hospital and transportation agencies; broadcast and
print media representatives; community groups and owners and
operators of facilities subject to regulation.
Nationally, 4,000 LEPCs now exist within ten larger U.S.
emergency management regions as designated by both the EPA and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 7 The map
reproduced below depicts these Emergency Management Regions.
Because of the historic U.S. pattern of political jurisdictions, roughly
one-fourth of the LEPCs are in New England (part of Region I) and are
town-or community-based. Elsewhere, counties or regions, normally
much larger in geographic area, are the basis for emergency planning
districts.
5 John H. Sorenson & Barbara M. Vogt, Emergency Planning for Nuclear
Accidents: Contentions and Issues, Symposium: Nuclear Radiation and Public Health
Practices and Policies in the Post-Chernobyl World (Oak Ridge National Laboratory
1987).
6 Ute J. Dymon & Nancy L. Winter, Evacuation Mapping: The Utility of
Guidelines, 17(1) Disasters 12 (1993).
7 Personal interview with Leonard Wallace, Director, EPA Region I, Lexington,
MA (1993).
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Emergency Management Regions 8
Emergency Planning Maps
Two major forms of emergency planning maps are vital to effective
functioning of any LEPC. The first uses risk assessment in pre-
emergency planning to inform emergency managers of high risk areas
in their communities, based upon both natural and technological
hazards. The second facilitates response during or after an extreme
event. Under the constraints of an emergency, when decision makers
lack time to read lengthy text, well-designed maps provide a quick and
comprehensive view of the situation.
Such maps offer a view of a disaster's spatial impact and allow
speedy notification of all affected utilities and institutions. They also
help emergency managers control the cause of a crisis while supervising
public safety through evacuation. Finally, during an emergency, maps
8 Adapted from 55 F.R. 8823 (1990). Alaska and Hawaii are omitted because of
space limitations; they are in Regions X and IX, respectively. [Ed.]
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also serve as key devices for answering media questions and/or
informing the public. 9 The key advantage of both risk maps and
response maps is that they can be prepared before an emergency. Still,
in many communities, map resources are often scarce or non-existent,
leaving such communities ill-prepared to deal with emergencies. 10
Although SARA III does not explicitly refer to maps, instructions
for mapping are ihcorporated by reference to the National Contingency
Plan established under CERCLA § 10511 that directs guidance
documents for preparation and implementation of emergency plans to
be published. Specific suggestions for map production by LEPCs are
detailed in such guidance documents from the FEMA and EPA.
FEMA Directives for SARA Tide III Mapping
FEMA describes the major role and development of LEPCs as:
Comprehensive Emergency Response Plans drawn
up by each local emergency planning committee must
be. reviewed at least once a year and must contain
evacuation plans, including provisions for a
precautionary evacuation and alternative traffic routes.
These comprehensive plans have come to be known as "EOPs" or
"emergency operations plans". By September, 1988, 12 different
Federal Government publications focusing on preparedness and
response planning considerations described differing planning criteria
for EOPs.
FEMA's Basic Plan for an EOP
To support the Integrated Emergency Management System
(IEMS) 12 approach to multihazard emergency operations planning,
9 National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication, 7 (1989). See also,
J. Sorenson & D. Mileti, Risk Communication in Emergencies in Communicating
Risks to the Public 368 (Roger J. Kasperson & Pieter Jan M. Stallen eds. 1991)
(describes risk communication difficulties during an emergency and offers an
emergency risk communication model).
10 Ute J. Dymon & Nancy L. Winter, Emergency Mapping in Grass Roots
America: A Derailment Evacuation Case Study, 22(4) Geoforum 377 (1991).
11 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
12 David McLoughlin, A Framework for Integrated Emergency Management, 45
Pub. Admn. Rev. (Special Issue, Jan. 1985).
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FEMA developed a Guide for the Review of State and Local
Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) 13 to clarify basic policy. It
aimed at improving the quality of EOPs and facilitating the review of
such plans. The Basic Plan for an EOP according to FEMA includes:
(1) Direction and Control, (2) Communications, (3) Warning, (4)
Emergency Support Services (ESS), (5) Radiological Defense, (6)
Emergency Public Information, (7) Evacuation and (8) Shelter. Also, in
regard to mapping specifically, § 8(c) requires that any EOP "identifies
on maps the primary and alternate evacuation routes for the established
risk area(s) in the jurisdiction."
The description of the Basic Plan lists the following as requirements
for the Introduction section of an EOP:
A summary of the jurisdiction's hazard
identificationprocess that includes.., in section (b) maps
which identi high hazard areas/sites and preselected
monitoring points for emergencies. These maps show:
1. High risk areas (nuclear attack target areas,
floodplains, flashfiood areas, earthquake zones)
2. Probable high risk sites (dams, nuclear power
plants, hazardous materials production sites, storage and
disposal facilities, etc.)
3. Evacuation routes
4. Location of public shelters
5. Location of a primary/alternate EOC and other
critical direction and control facilities
6. Major roads, railways, and waterways that are
used to transport the extremely hazardous substances
(EHS), as defined in Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, that are
produced or stored in the jurisdiction.
As categories of map content, these requirements enhance hazard
identification (1 and 6), provide public information upon which citizens
may base their actions (3 and 4), and facilitate emergency management
planning (1, 2, 5 and 6). Items 1 and 2 represent a request for multiple
hazard mapping (MHM)14 which depicts on a single map not only the
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for the Review of State and
Local Emergency Operations Plans (1988).
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technological hazards in a given area but also the magnitude, frequency,
and area of effect of varying natural hazards. 15
Community Risk Assessment
Data collected for mapping in a given community must be
analyzed and characterized through risk assessment. This process
creates the basis for sophisticated multihazard mapping to identify
areas of highest risk within the emergency planning district. This
comprehensive view of risk is inherent in the FEMA map content lists
detailed above. Designing an EOP that adheres to FEMA guidelines
requires an LEPC to mesh data about natural hazards such as floods,
earthquakes and hurricanes with data about an almost infinite list of
possible technologial hazards including on-site chemical releases and
explosions, in-transit chemical emergencies, nuclear incidents, air and
train crashes and dam failures. Thus, assessing local risks is the key to
design and production of viable maps. Yet, in EPA Region I, an
adequate multihazard risk assessment of an emergency planning district
has yet to be accomplished by an LEPC.
Community Compliance in Region I
Under SARA III, each LEPC is required to file an EOP for state
approval, but each LEPC also has the right to submit its emergency
plan for federal review. Fifteen federal agencies1 6 constitute the
National Response Team (NRT) and the regional representatives of
these agencies review the plan. The submitting LEPC then receives a
100 page report from the NRT citing the inadequacies and adequacies
in its plan. In the-eight years since SARA III was promulgated, only ten
of approximately 1,000 LEPCs in Region I have submitted EOPs for
14 Department of Regional Development and Environment Executive Secretariat for
Economic and Social Affairs, Organization of American States, Primer on Natural
Hazard Management in Integrated Regional Development Planning (1991)
(Hazardous natural phenomena include extreme geophysical threats that are geologic,
seismic, atmospheric and hydrologic.).
15 See Figure 6-1, id., at. 6-5.
16 For a list of the National Response Team (NRT) agencies, see 55 F. R. 8821
(1990).
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federal review. They include: New Bedford and Fall River,
Massachusetts; Bristol, East Providence and Providence, Rhode Island;
Bow, Nashua and Concord, New Hampshire, the Tri-Town District of
Connecticut encompassing East Lyme, Waterford and New London;
and Windham County, Vermont, with Brattleboro as its largest
municipality. The key cartographic fact is that none of these ten plans
encompassed a risk assessment process which produced the pre-
emergency risk maps envisioned in the FEMA guidelines. Generally,
also, there is a dearth of emergency response mapping on the local level
which often results in cases of emergency managers having to make
decisions about the physical situation and evacuations without the
spatial information maps provide. However, an outstanding example of
emergency management highlights the positive results of the
emergency mapping inspired by SARA III.
Marlborough's Gasoline Spill
A potentially explosive emergency was managed expeditiously
through a combination of creative crisis mapping and response maps
hand-produced by an individual inspired by SARA III guidelines. It
occurred in Marlborough, Massachusetts, a city of about 31,000
population with a large number of French-Canadian and Portuguese
inhabitants. Located sixty miles west of Boston, and part of its high-
tech industrial belt, a network of major highways makes the city easily
accessible from Boston and Worcester. Marlborough's high-tech labor
force commutes from these nearby cities and smaller communities,
swelling the population on an average working day to about 130,000.
Fortuitously, the incident occurred on a cold, winter Saturday
night. A truck delivering to a downtown gas station experienced a crack
in a hose, spilling about 100 gallons of gasoline into the main street
storm drain. Shortly after this was reported, pockets of gasoline vapors
set off underground explosions causing manhole covers to fly into the
air. Fumes seeped into the basements of several houses, causing major
explosions and severely damaging many houses.
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The Need for a Crisis Map1 7
Controlling the spill became a major concern and resulted in an
unusual form of crisis map concocted on-the-spot to aid in control and
response efforts. Following the spill, the delivery truck driver swiftly
contacted the Fire Department. According to emergency procedures,
the local Fire Chief became the commander-in-chief for emergency
plan implementation. After contacting emergency personnel, he
ordered evacuation of residences on both sides of the affected storm
drain. After consulting the town's hazard maps, he identified the full
danger zone and ordered an evacuation of all residents within the area.
There was great uncertainty as to where the actual, danger lay
because potential underground seepage was complicated by the fact
that the main street also contained an abandoned, antiquated former
sewer system which led off to no one knew where. No current sewer
maps showed the aged drains. To visualize the pattern and extent of the
ancient drains, a search had to be conducted in the files of the public
works department. No one map showed the old drain system, but a
series of maps were found that, when taped together, resulted in an
eight foot long crisis map depicting the old underground channels. This
crude map enabled emergency decision makers to determine potential
sources for further explosions.
The next morning, most evacuees were permitted to return to their
homes, but those living in houses affected by explosions or having
potential for later explosions had to stay elsewhere for a few days. In
spite of the severity of the accident, no major injuries were reported,
possibly because the media helped to distribute information to the
public.
Hazard Maps and Response Maps
In Marlborough, more serious consequences of the spill were surely
averted by the impetus provided by SARA III and the dedication of a
town employee who attempted to meet the FEMA guidelines.
Marlborough had designated one of its local firefighters as the
emergency manager, and he took a major interest in training himself
17 See Dymon & Winter, supra note 10.
5 Risk: Health, Salty & Environment 337 [Spring 1994]
and fellow firefighters in most aspects of emergency preparedness. One
of his special interests was preparation of an extensive set of emergency
planning maps.
Marlborough, like many other LEPCs, had meager resources for
emergency planning. Even though the town had a CAMEO computer
system for storage of town data and map production, no one was
trained to use it. Yet, this did not deter the emergency manager from
hand producing a set of perhaps lifesaving hazard and response maps.
Although the response was ad hoc, this is often the essence of an
emergency. Usually some aspect of emergency decision making
requires handling of unforeseen conditions. However, the combination
of available hand-drawn hazard and evacuation maps with a hastily-
assembled crisis map gave the commander information needed for
decision making.
Hazard maps were drawn in Marlborough, but the real SARA III
goal of having a combined natural and technological risk map was not
achieved. Following steps in FEMA's risk assessment process under
SARA III, the emergency manager sent an extensive questionnaire to all
industries, businesses and residences as an appendix to the city census to
collect data concerning the location of critical facilities, the storage and
transportation of hazardous materials and the location of sensitive
populations. Using detailed base maps from the city's engineering
department, designed for zoning, utilities and services, he produced
hazard maps by coloring in: 1) industries and businesses storing
hazardous materials, 2) roadways used to transport hazardous materials
and 3) lists of hazardous materials and their effects on humans and the
environment. 18
Each site for storage of hazardous materials became a circle with a
radius of one mile. Strip-shaped buffer areas depicting routes employed
for transportation of hazardous materials also are shown. This was the
first step in preparing a risk map for the town. To produce the risk map
recommended by FEMA for an EOP, data about the location and
18 Map quality prevented their being reproduced here.
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probability of harm from other potential technological and natural
hazards would need to be added.
Another map that aided decision makers in handling evacuations
shows single versus multiple housing. Each block displays and lists by
individual citizens' names those in need of special care, the physically or
mentally impaired, nursing home residents, those in childcare centers
and students in private and public schools. Lists attached to these
sensitive population maps are color-coded according to special needs so
that a decision maker can identify special evacuation requirements for a
specific citizens at a glance.
Other important maps produced by the emergency manager
include a critical facilities map locating fire stations, police stations,
utilities, hospitals, bus stations and care facilities and a map featuring all
facilities, such as schools and churches, that could be used for
emergency shelter, color coding officially designated emergency
shelters. To make them durable for field use, the maps were also
laminated, but information could be added to the outer surface of the
maps as needed. On the night of the gasoline spill, these maps were
available to all emergency personnel in the fire station.
Availability and use of the hazard and response maps made by the
Marlborough emergency manager increased the speed of decision
making for both evacuations and managing the dangerous physical
conditions. They were also handy for explaining the accident and its
impact to media representatives who, in turn, informed members of the
public who are often unable to comprehend complex technological
processes which pose risks in a given situation. 19 Radio and television
news alerted the public and provided explanations to improve the
understanding of persons affected by it and of their worried friends
and relatives.
19 See M. L. Baughman, Media Amplification of Risk: Implications for Hazardous
Materials Transport; presented Ann. Mtg. Socy Risk Analysis (1991) and NRC,
supra note 8, at 7.
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Summary and Conclusions
During a disaster, -emergency managers are under great pressure to
make decisions that may affect the lives of thousands of people, often
with only a few minutes to analyze a situation and act. The hazard and
emergency maps used during the Marlborough gasoline spill clearly
provided needed information. While cartographically simple, they
served their purposes by enabling prompt and appropriate responses and
by helping to inform the public.
Their availability is a credit to an individual who had a keen interest
in mapping and a strong commitment to emergency planning and,
during the emergency, to a team that created an invaluable crisis map
from town archives. Yet, the incident highlights a lack of local focus
and funding to implement the CAMEO computer mapping system
supported by EPA.
In contrast, as Lindell and Perry report, "despite the critical roles
assigned to local governments in emergency management, their
performance to date has been spotty."2 0 Not only do severe budget
problems lead communities to give map preparation low priority, but
comprehensive emergency management planning is hindered by lack of
awareness of hazards and the potential for harm to their communities.
The Marlborough situation highlights the urgent need for full risk
mapping as delineated by FEMA. If such maps become available, risks
will be more clearly defined and emergencies more readily coped with.
Monmonier and Schnell21 suggest that the design of effective risk
maps requires an understanding of the intended audience and its
limitations. They point out that elected officials and the general public
require concise, straightforward, simplified presentations. One
deterrent to local risk assessments expected by FEMA in the Basic Plan
for EOPs is the sophisticated calculations required to complete them.
20 M. K. Lindell & R. W. Perry, Behavioral Foundations of Community
Emergency Planning 29 (1992).
21 See Mark Monmonier & George A. Schnell, Natural Hazard Mapping: Status
and Review in Natural and Technological Disasters: Causes, Effects and Preventive
Measures 441(1992).
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Changing environmental laws complicate the process. Under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990,22 each emergency planning district must
define what is "environmentally sensitive" and must determine the
resources to be protected. The planning process for the new Clean Air
Act 2 3 Title III § 112r2 4 has just started and involves the need to
monitor 112 substances. Proposed regulations for the Clean Air Act go
into effect in November, 1994, and within two years, facilities handling
covered substances must submit air pollution reports to their LEPCs
describing worst case scenarios and possibly even consequence flow
charts. No Region I LEPC has yet submitted risk assessment maps, and
these new regulations will make this even more difficult.
Local politics may compound the problem. It is possible that
preparation' and publication of risk maps may cause, e.g., property
values to drop in high risk areas. This, too, may hinder required
mapping and prolong the unavailability of an important missing link in
emergency planning and response.
22 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
23 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
24 42 U.S.C. §7412(r).
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